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KENNETH A. SWIECICKI,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

Case No. 18315

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant/Respondents.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review in accordance with Utah
Code Annotated 35-4-lO(i) seeking a reversal of the Board of Review's decision denying him unemployment benefits.
Plaintiff was denied benefits,

pursuant to U.C.A.

35-4-S(d), from

August 2 through August 8, 1981 by virtue of his unemployment arising from
a strike i nvol vi ng his grade, cl ass or group of workers at the establishment where he was last employed.

Plaintiff was also denied benefits on the

ground that he left work voluntarily without good cause, U.C.A. 35-4-S(a).
The effective date under this last provision was August 2, 1981, with the
- 1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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disqualification period to extend until

such time as Plaintiff has earned

wages at least six times his weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.
The issue on appeal is whether there is competent and reasonable evidence in the record to support the Board of Review's decision denying
Plaintiff unemployment benefits.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an affinnance of the Board of Review's decision denying
Plaintiff unemployment benefits and further prays that the Court will deny
Plaintiff any costs or attorney's fees incurred in this action.
FACTUAL SITUATION
Plaintiff was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration in February, 1974, (R.0040) and was employed as an air traffic controller at the Salt
Lake City Tower during the time period in question herein (R.0040).
On August 3, 1981, Plaintiff failed to report for work (R.0041) with
full knowledge that an air traffic controller strike ·had begun on the same
day (R.0049).

Plaintiff was a member of the Professional Air Traffic Con-

trollers Organization (PATCO) (R.0040 & .0059), which was the union calling
the strike ( R.0059), and Pl ai nti ff subsequently did not report to work on
August 4 and 5 as the strike proceeded (R.0041).
On August 6, 1981, Plaintiff telephoned Mr. Warren Lee, Deputy Chief,
Salt Lake City Tower, at about 7:00 a.m. regarding the procedure for reporting to work (R.0047) within President Reagan's amnesty period (R.0042-0043).

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff apparently had some knowledge of the amnesty period (R.0041) despite his confusion with media reports {R.0062).

Plaintiff infonned Mr. Lee

that he was prepared to come to work (R.0047) and Mr. Lee responded that
Plaintiff should report to work by 8 a.m. (R.0047).

If Plaintiff had re-

ported at 8 a.m. on August 6, then he would have complied with the amnesty
program and been all owed to work ( R.0042).

Plaintiff indicated he would

report by 8 a.m. or shortly thereafter (R.0047), but apparently failed to do
so and called Mr. Lee some time after 8 a.m. {R.0047).

At this time, Mr. Lee

extended Plaintiff's time for reporting to work until 9 a.m. (R.0047).
At approximately 9:00 or 9:15 a.m., Plaintiff contacted Mr. Lee and
told him he would report for duty, and Mr. Lee replied,

11

Fine. 11

(R.0047).

Mr. Lee then proceeded to give Plaintiff instructions on how to gain access
to the tower (R.0047).

Plaintiff was to enter the airport on the east side

and park in the Utah National Guard area lR.0049).

This entrance was on

the opposite side of the airport from the tower (R.0049) and Plaintiff was
to be ·transported from there to the tower by ·van (R.0049)..

This procedure

was part of the F.A.A.' s contingency pl an that had been in effect si nee the
strike began (R.0049).

It is disputed whether Plaintiff would have to cross

any picket lines when entering the Utah National Guard parking -area (R.0049),
but no evi de nee was offered to show that violence had erupted when i ndivi duals attempted to cross the picket lines.
In response to Mr. Lee's instructions, Plaintiff stated that, "I cannot
do something like that at this time.

11

(R.0048).

Plaintiff, subsequently,

did not attempt to report to work (R.0048), but he did report later in the
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evening around 11:30 p.m. (R.0041 & 0049) after being approached by the
F.B.I. (R.0041 & 0048).
the evening (R.0049).

No pickets were present when Plaintiff reported in
Upon presenting himself to the supervisor, Plaintiff

was told that an intent to tenninate was in progress and he should leave the
facility immediately (R.0041).
Plaintiff contacted the Salt Lake Tower on the morning of August 7 and
infonned the personnel he was seeking professional help (R.0043).

This was

the first time Plaintiff had made any mention of illness to the personnel at
the tower {R.0042).

Later that day Plaintiff was treated by Dr. David A.

Schein, M.D., Ph.D., (R.0042 & 0064) for anxiety, insomnia and other disorders {R.0041 & 0064).

These disorders, however, had apparently developed

during the las.t few days of July {R.0042), although Dr. Schien stated in
his letter the air traffic controller strike led to these disorders (R.0064).
Dr. Schein prescribed valium for treatment of Plaintiff's disorders {R.0042).
On August 9, 1981, a letter was sent to Plaintiff infonning him of an
intent to remove him from his position as air traffic controller {R.0064 &
0065).

Plaintiff responded in a letter dated August 19, 1981, setting forth

his reasons for not reporting to work (R.0062).

In his letter, Plaintiff

attached Dr. Schei n's letter containing a diagnosis of Plaintiff's condition
( R.0067).

As a result of Plaintiff's response, Dr. H. C. Burton, Assistant

Regional Fl.ight Surgeon for the Salt Lake Air Traffic Control Center, was
asked to investigate Plaintiff's illness and detennine suitability for work
(R.0044).

Dr.

Burton reviewed Plaintiff's medical

records and concluded

there was no documented findings which rendered Plaintiff medically disabled
and unfit for duty {R.0058).

Consequently, Pl ai nti ff was i nfonned by a
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letter dated September 8, 1981, that he was officially tenninated effective
September 15, 1981 (R.0056).
Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits on August 27, 1981 (R.0061).
Plaintiff was denied benefits in a decision rendered by Tom L. Brant pursuant
. to the U.C.A.

35-4-5( d)

(R.0055).

Detennination, Form 615-A,
35-4-S{b) (1) (R.0054\.

Pl ai nti ff al so

stating denial

Plaintiff appealed

received an El gibil ity

of benefits pursuant to U.C.A.
the denial

Appeals Referee on October 13, 1981 {R.0052).

of benefits to the

The Referee denied benefits

pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-5(d) and 5(a) (R.0035-0037), and the Board of Review
1

affi nned the Referee s decision ( R.0016).

Thereafter, Plaintiff fi 1ed this

appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Defendant submits

that this

Department is limited to dee i ding

Court's

whether there is substantial

evidence to sustain such detenninations.
Utah 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

review of detenninations of the

Martinez v.

competent

Board of Review,

25

A reversal of an order of the Department

denying compensation can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the detennination and the facts giving rise to a right to

- 5 -
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compensation are

so

persuasive

capricious, arbitrary,

and

that

the Department's

unreasonable.

of Emp. Sec., 13 Utah 2d 262,

denial

was

Kennecott Copper Corp.

372 P. 2d 987

clearly
v.

Dept.

(1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18

Utah 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44,45 (1966); Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review,
568

P. 2d 727 {Utah 1977); In

dustrial Commission,

Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. In-

104 Utah 242,

139 P.

2d 208,

211,

the Court said:

If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain
the findings and decisions of the Industrial Commission,
this court may not set aside the decision even though on
a review of the record we might well have reached a different result.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S UNEMPLOYMENT, DURING THE PERIOD OF AUGUST 3
THROUGH AUGUST 6, WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING HIS GRADE, CLASS OR GROUP OF
WORKERS, AND PLAINTIFF IS THEREFORE INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS
FOR THAT PERIOD.
The Defendant wishes to bring to the Court's attention that Plaintiff
did not address in his
35-4-5{d).

Brief the denial

Plaintiff merely

states

in

of benefits pursuant to U.C.A.

his

Brief

{at

page

10)

that

he

should be disqualified for voluntarily leaving work for the duration only
of the period August 3 through August 6, 1981.

However, such a conclusion

ignores the fact that a strike was in progress during that period, and that
Plaintiff failed to cross

the picket lines.

(R.0040, 0041}.

Under such

circumstances, this court has previously held that benefits must be denied
pursuant to Section 5(d)

of the Employment Security Act.

Kennecott Copper

Corp. Employees v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., Supra.

- 6 -
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POINT III
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF
VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, AND SUCH DECISION
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The issues presented by this case are:

1) whether the Pl ai nti ff• s

fai 1ure to report for work as requi rd by his employer constitutes a vol u ntary quit; and 2) whether the Plaintiff had good cause for not reporting
to work as required by the employer.
Voluntary quitting is a mixed question of law and fact.
Board of Revfew of the Industrial Commission, 567

P.

2d 626

Denby v.

{Utah,

1977).

This court has repeatedly held that the di squal i fi ca ti on provisions of the
Employment Security Act reveal

an underlying legislative intent for the

commission to detenni ne a claimant's eligibility by adhering to the vol iti onal test; 01 of Ne 1son Construction Co. v. I ndustri a1 Commission, 121 Utah
525, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Lexes v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 551, 243
P. 2d 964 (1952); or in other words, a claimant will be ineligible for benefits if his unemployment is· the result of voluntary action by him and was
not caused by some· coercive factor or economic influence beyond his control.
Mills v. Gronning, 581 P.
common 1y k now n as the

11

2d 1334, 1337 {Utah, .1978).

This principle is

fau1 t concept. 11

Plaintiff argues that he was discharged and that his discharge must be
evaluated under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
(Pocket Supplement).

See Plaintiff's Brief, page 10.

While it is undisputed

that the claimant was discharged, both the Appeal Referee and the Board of
Review concluded that the facts of the case were more consistent with a
voluntary leaving than a discharge for misconduct.

- 7 -
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There is a split among the many jurisdictions which have dealt with
the question of voluntary leaving v. discharge for misconduct, under circumstances where an employee is tenninated for failure to report to work.
See Annotation, "Discharge for Absenteeism as Affecting Right to Unempl oyment Compensation," 41 ALR 2d 1158 (1955).

See also Annotation, "Discharge

for Absenteeism or Tardiness as Affecting Right to Unemployment Compensation, 11 58 ALR 3rd 674 ( 1974).

The decisions referred to in these annota-

tions all appear to rely on the specific law of the jurisdiction involved
and the facts of the particular case.

However, in general, it appears the

courts which held that the claimant was discharged for misconduct found
the claimant's conduct to meet that level of "willful, wanton or deliberate" conduct normally associated with the definition of misconduct, as set
forth in Boynton Cab Company v. Nuebeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N. W. 636; and
as adopted by this court in Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission of Utah, Supra.

On the other hand, those courts

·which applied the voluntary leaving disqualification generally found each
claimant's actions to be the result of voluntary choice not affected by
factors beyond the claimant's control, but not rising to the level of culpability necessary to find misconduct.

Although a discharge for misconduct

also generally results from the voluntary action of the employee, the difference in cases of this nature lies in the evidence of an intent to hann the
employer or to deliberately disregard the employer's rightful
Lacking sue h intent, a claimant's actions may· not be misconduct.

interests.
However,

where the claimant's actions are voluntary and not influenced by "coercive
factors or economic influence beyond his control, 11 the claimant• s resulting
unemployment is volitional, thus subjecting him to di squal i ficati on under
the Act.
- 8 -
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In the instant case the Appeal

Referee concluded that the evidence

of record indicated that the claimant's failure to return to work within
the "grace period" was voluntary and that his resulting unemployment was,
therefore, volitional.
The undisputed facts in this matter are that Plaintiff was employed by
the Federal Aviation Admi ni strati on as an air traffic controller at the
Salt Lake Air Traffic Control Center; that a nationwide air traffic controllers' strike commenced on or about August 3, 1981; that Plaintiff failed to
report for work on August 3, 4 and 5, 1981; that President Reagan granted
an "amnesty period" for all air traffic controllers who would report for
work at the beginning of their first scheduled shift after 11 a.m. Eastern
Standard Time; that Plaintiff did not report for work as scheduled at
8 a.m. on August 6, nor did he report after a one hour extension to 9 a.m.,
but rather, Pl ai nti ff reported at 11 :30 p .m. the night of August 6, and
then only after the F.B.l. advised Pl ai nti ff that a restraining order was
in effect which "literally scared the hell out of" Plaintiff.
tiff's Brief, pages 3, 4 8, · 9.)

(See Plain-

Upon Plaintiff's failure to comply with

the tenns of the President's "Amnesty Period," Plaintiff was tenninated by
the employer.
Given the foregoing facts, the Appeal

Referee and Board of Review

properly concluded that the claimant voluntarily left his employment.
Pl ai nti ff argues that even if the court finds he voluntarily quit,
he did so with good cause, or at least that his quit was under such circumstances that a denial of benefits is contrary to equity and good consi ence.
(Plaintiff's Brief, pages

11~15.)
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Plaintiff's argument that he had good cause for leaving work or that
his leaving. was reasonable under the circumstances is based on the contention that he was subjected to external pressures causing him emotional and
physical problems.

However, the Appeal Referee found that the record fails

to support the Plaintiff's contention that he was ill, stating:
••• He did not see a doctor until August 8, 1981
and he failed to notify the employer on either August 5, or August 6, 1981 that he was ill and unable
to work.· There is no evidence to indicate that, in
fact, the claimant was ill on either August 5, or
August 6, 1981 and i't must be held that, by fa.il ing
to return to work, the claimant voluntarily left
his job, inasmuch as he knew he would forfeit his
job if he did not report back. (R.0036)
Plaintiff testified that he was absent due to illness.

(R.0042)

Yet,

he did not see a doctor until August 7, 1981, (R.0064) after he was told
of the tennination action.

Plaintiff's physician reported that Plaintiff

was seen for "anxiety and nervous disorders," a "situational
related to the air traffic controllers strike.

(R.0064)

condition"

The Assistant

Regional Flight Surgeon for the F.A.A. reviewed the Plaintiff's doctor's
report and concluded there were no medical i ndi cations of i 11 ness, only the
Plaintiff's subjective complaints, and that, therefore, the Plaintiff's illness did not render him unfit for duty.

{R. 0058)

The Plaintiff's testimony

on this point is also very self-serving, and ambiguous:
Referee:

Well did you mention to Mr. Lee that you were
having medical problems?
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Claimant:

Not at this time. I wasn't even that aware
of the fact at this point. I mean a person
that has a nervous breakdown, you have a
heck of a time convincing of it.

Referee:

You know I don't really have evidence that
you ·had a nervous breakdown.

Claimant:

I'm not saying that - -

Referee:

I imagine there were 130 individuals roughly
that were experiencing some of the same
symptoms you were.

Claimant:

That might be a good assumption. Maybe
there was a lot of militant types out there
that weren't.

Referee:

Well, that's possible, but I don't think
your reaction would be that abnormal, considering what was going on. You know sometimes I don't sleep too well at nights
thinking what's going to take place the next
day myself. So I don't really have evidence
that you· had an actual nervous breakdown.

Claimant:

I didn't say that. Please. If you took me
wrong on that, I'm just saying I was making
an observation that you asked me, did I know
I was sic.k at the time, and I'm saying in
some illnesses, you don't know you have it
until three, four, five days later. Isn't
that a possibility?

Referee:

I guess it's a possibility, but you

Claimant:

Isn't it as possible as everybody out there
being a nervous wreck over a strike and some
people not. I mean, there's a million possibilities.

In light of such evidence the Appeal Referee and Board of Review properly concluded that the claimant was not prevented by illness from reporting
to work.
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POINT IV
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED, HE IS
STILL NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS.
As explained in Point III hereof, the jurisdictions which have considered the issue of discharge v. quit in cases of absenteeism have split in
their conclusions.

Part of the reason for this dichotomy arises from the

particular facts of each case being adjudicated.

Another part of the reason

; s that the facts sometimes support different conclusions.

For example,

see Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review, Supra.
However, should this Court decide the facts herein amount to a discharge, Pl ai nti ff is sti 11 not entitled to benefits.

Pl ai nti ff' s partici-

pation in an i l_l egal work stoppage and failure to report to work after
requested to do so is willful disregard of his employer's interest that is
sufficient to constitute willful misconduct.

See Bays v. Com., Unemployment

Compensation Bd., 437 A. 2 d 72 (Pa. Comwl th. 1981) , Reinhard v. Com., Utiemp.
Comp. Bd of Review,
cannot prevail..

410 A.

2d 401 (Pa. Cmwl th. 1980).

Plaintiff, therefore,

See also, Januzik v. Department of Employment Security, 569

P. 2d 1112 (Utah, 1977), in which this court stated:
It has frequently been held in other jurisdictions that
excessive absenteeism without good cause, constitutes
willful misconduct, particularly where the employee fails
to report to his employer, or continues to be absent or
tardy after warnings by the employer. [Footnote ommitted.]

- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the Board of Review denying Plaintiff unemployment
benefits on the basis that he left work voluntarily without good cause is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Plaintiff does not dis-

pute his disqualification for the period of August 3 through August 6, 1981,
due to his participation in an illegal work stoppage.

The decision of the

Board of Review, being reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, should
be affi nned.
DATED this 20th day of August, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General
By

---.Kr.--..A~11~a-n__.Za~b-e~1--------------
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